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COMMENTS
DISCLOSURE TO THE GUILTY
PLEADING DEFENDANT: BRADY v.
MARYLAND AND THE BRADY
TRILOGY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Criminal conviction in this country is achieved largely through plea
negotiation, rather than trial. The vast majority of criminal defendants
plead guilty in exchange for sentencing concessions.' By pleading
guilty, a defendant waives a number of constitutional protections, the
most important of which is the right to trial. 2 The defendant's act of
self-conviction typically consists of two stages. Plea bargaining between
the defense and the prosecution is the first and more important stage.
These negotiations are informal and totally outside the purview of
judges, yet a court will enforce the agreement that the parties have
made. 3 Plea bargaining is not a situation in which the parties have
equal bargaining power. The defendant pleads guilty based on the extent of his knowledge of the prosecutor's case against him and any tactical, mitigating, or exculpatory information that might exist. 4 In
contrast, the second stage is a formal and perfunctory proceeding in
which the trial judge accepts the defendant's plea and gives his imprimatur to the informal agreement. 5 Thus the process accorded the guilty
1 D. NEWMAN, CONvICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (1966). Newman reports that approximately 90% of all criminal defendants
plead guilty. His study is accepted as there are no more recent studies of comparable completeness nor is there any reason to doubt the percentage of defendants pleading guilty has
lessened over the years.
2 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969). Among others are the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to
confront one's accusers, and the right to obtain witnesses in one's favor. For other rights and
privileges of lesser importance waived by a guilty plea, see Bishop, Waivers in PleasofGuilly, 60
F.R.D. 513 (1974).
3 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (1977);
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
4 See text accompanying notes 29-55 infra.
5 See text accompanying notes 56-59 infra.
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pleading defendant consists primarily of informed plea negotiation with
the prosecution and only secondarily of formal plea acceptance proceedings.
The Supreme Court has sanctioned plea bargaining, 6 and, with the
exception of recognizing the possibility of coercion during the negotiations, 7 has done so by ignoring the realities of this unsupervised practice.
The Court assumes that plea negotiations are conducted fairly. Consequently, the Court enforces plea agreements in a manner reminiscent of
the now discredited "freedom of contract" decisions of the late nineteenth century; the defendant is held to his bargain as long as the apparent inequities do not approach unconscionable proportions. Ironically,
the "due process revolution" of the Warren Court 8 focused on the relatively small percentage of criminal defendants who stand trial, 9 but for
the defendant who pleads guilty those decisions at best have meant that
he has more rights with which to negotiate. The Court's principal contribution to due process for the guilty pleading defendant is Boykin v.
Alabama,' 0 a judicial gloss on the formal plea acceptance proceeding.
One of the principal aspects of unfairness in plea bargaining is the
defendant's inability to obtain pertinent information known only to the
prosecution. While being told which rights are waived by a guilty plea
is useful to the defendant, it is of little value to the defendant and his
counsel if lack of relevant information prevents them from a reasoned
decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial. The type of information that would aid the defense in this decision includes all items relevant to an assessment of the prosecution's case against the defendant.
Ideally, this information would be available to the defense through regular preplea discovery." Most important, the Court's decision in Brady
v. Marland12 should be interpreted to require prosecutorial disclosure of
6 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363-64; Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. at 71-72;
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52
(1970).
7 The possibility that a plea might be induced by threats, misrepresentation, or other
improper means was recognized in Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir.
1957), reo'don othergrounds , 356 U.S. 26 (1958), and by the Supreme Court in Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. at 755. See note 139 infra.
8 The term "due process revolution" refers to the series of Supreme Court decisions of the
Warren era which made the criminal procedural protections of the fifth and sixth amendments binding on the states through the fourteenth amendment. See note 135 ina.
9 Alschuler, Plea Bargainingand Its Histog, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 37 (1979).
10 395 U.S. 238. See text accompanying notes 56-59 in/fa.
11 See text accompanying notes 95-126 infra.
12 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The reader should note that two Supreme Court cases with the
name "Brady" will be discussed in this article. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, dealing with
the prosecution's duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense, will often be referred to
by the words "Brad rule," "Bray violation," and "Brady material." See text accompanying
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all favorable evidence material to the issue of guilt or punishment, or to
the informed decision to waive the right to trial.
Postconviction challenges to guilty pleas that are grounded in nondisclosure in violation of Brady v. Maland are rare, probably because
many violations prior to the entry of a plea go undiscovered.' 3 The
Supreme Court has never resolved the question of whether a Brady violation is cognizable by a court in a postconviction proceeding notwithstanding a guilty plea. United States v. Agurs,' 4 in which the Court set
forth the standards of materiality to be used in applying the Brady rule,
arguably determines the showing of materiality the guilty pleading de5
fendant must make to fit the withheld evidence within the Brad rule.1
However, because none of the Court's decisions concerning the
prosecutorial duty to disclose dealt with a guilty plea, this question remains open. An analysis of the small body of law dealing with the validity of guilty pleas preceded by Brady violations reveals a judicial attempt
to resolve questions presented by the overlap of two areas of the law: the
prosecutorial duty to disclose' 6 and the waiver of constitutional rights
17
by a guilty plea.
Four different yet interrelated models can be used to analyze the
question of whether a Brady v. Maland violation is a valid basis for a
court to vacate a guilty plea, and if so, what the standard of materiality
of the evidence withheld should be. First, a plea of guilty preceded by
the prosecutor's failure to disclose material and favorable evidence is
unintelligent because the defendant and his counsel lacked sufficient inwhether to plead guilty or stand
to make a"lisgo
reasoned edecision
formation
in"ra
trial.18 Second,
idclaimounded in Brady v. Maitland are forfeited by a
guilty plea, which cures the due process violation, thereby enabling the
state to proceed against the defendant once again.' 9 Third, a guilty plea
notes 65-74 infra. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, which addresses the standards for
plea bargaining will be referred to by the words "Brady trilogy," which also includes Parker v.

North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, and McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759. See text accompanying notes 29-55 & 145-47 infra.
13 Nakell, CriminalDiscoveyfor the Defense andfor the Prosecution-TheDeveloping Constitutional
Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 453 (1972).
14

427 U.S. 97 (1976).

15 See text accompanying notes 75-95 in/fra.
16 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83. An analysis of
the Court's decisions involving the prosecutorial duty to disclose between 1963 and 1976 can

be found in Comment, The ftosecultor5S Duty to Disclose: From Brady to Agurs and Bfyond, 69 J.

CRIM. L. & C. 197, 199-200 (1978). These decisions will not be discussed here because they
do not add anything to the law as espoused in Brad v.Mayland and United States v.Agurs.
17 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357; Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63; Santobello v.

New York, 404 U.S. 257; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790; McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742.
18 See text accompanying notes 145-65 infa.
19 See text accompanying notes 166-84 infa.
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is an admission of factual guilt which waives all claims of antecedent
constitutional violations unrelated to factual guilt.20 Fourth, the
prosecutorial duty under Brady v. Magland can be interpreted as an essential element of due process, which cannot be waived by a guilty plea
2
nor made dependent upon a specific defense request. '
In order to provide the necessary background for a discussion of
these four models, Part II of this comment will discuss plea negotiation
as an institution and will criticize the Court's erroneous assumptions regarding negotiated pleas. Part III will discuss the prosecutorial duty to
disclose as defined by Brady v. Marland22 and UnitedStates v. Agurs. 23 In
addition, criminal defense discovery as a solution to the problem of
prosecutorial withholding of material and favorable evidence will be examined. Part IV will use the four models to analyze the application of
the Brady v. Magland rule to postconviction attacks on pleas of guilty.
II.

PLEA BARGAINING

Guilty pleas obtained through bargains struck between the prosecution and the defense are the predominant means of conviction in state
and federal courts. 24 Administrative convenience is the easiest explanation for the high rate of guilty plea convictions; the criminal justice system cannot afford to give every defendant a trial 2 5 While the United
States Supreme Court26 and institutions such as the American Bar Association 2 7 have sanctioned plea bargaining, the academic community has
vociferously disapproved of the practice. 28 One critic of plea bargaining
contends that the Court has an overly optimistic view of the situation,
See text accompanying notes 186-99 infra.
See text accompanying notes 201-38 infra.
373 U.S. 83. See text accompanying notes 65-74 infra.
427 U.S. 97. See text accompanying notes 75-95 infa.
D. NEWMAN, supra note I, at 3; Alschuler (1979), supra note 9, at 33.
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the
accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining," is an essential component of the
administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were to be subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260. The Court's statement inspired this rejoinder.
[T]he view that plea bargaining is an "economic necessity" would gain plausibility if one
concluded that this shortcut to conviction had been employed for as long as there had
been trials, and even more clearly, the claim of economic necessity would become
strained if one concluded that the Anglo-American legal system had survived without
plea bargaining during most of its existence.
Alschuler (1979), supra note 9, at 2.
26 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. at 363-64; Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. at 71-72;
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 260-61; Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790; MrMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 751-52.
27 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIINAL JusTiCE, StandardsRelating to
Pleas of Guilty (Tent. draft 1967).
28 Plea bargaining has had an unsavory reputation in academic circles since the 1920s
20
21
22
23
24
25
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and has insulated negotiated pleas from later attack by making unrealis29
tic assumptions.
The Court assumes that informal plea negotiations are conducted
fairly. It has therefore ignored this decisive stage of the pleading process
while devoting its attention to the formal entry of the plea, which is
enveloped in procedural protections. 30 The supposed fairness of plea negotiations appears to be rooted in two troublesome assumptions made
by the Court. The first assumption is that all defendants who plead
guilty would be convicted if they stood trial. The second is that a defendant's plea is voluntary and intelligent if his counsel is present when
the plea is entered. 3 ' The realities of plea bargaining refute both of
these assumptions.
The Court's assumption that all guilty pleading defendants would
be convicted if they stood trial is implicit in Santobello v.New York 32 and
Brady v. United States.3 3 In Brady, the Court stated: "We would have
serious doubts about this case if the encouragement of guilty pleas by
offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants,
'3 4
advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.
This notion that the guilty pleading defendant would be convicted at
trial where he would receive a higher sentence than that which he bargained for is unwarranted because both the prosecutor and the defendant are adverse to taking unnecessary risks. The strength or weakness of
the state's case is the prosecutor's main consideration in plea bargaining;
therefore, the majority of prosecutors choose to negotiate pleas in cases
where victory at trial is less than a certainty.3 5 Given the lack of sufficient resources to prosecute and punish all offenders, the prosecutor's
initial decision to charge a defendant means that he has made his own
judgment that the defendant can be proven guilty of a crime. The proswhen the practice, by that time commonplace, first came to public attention. Alschuler
(1979), supra note 9, at 26-32.
29 A pervasive criticism of the Court's opinions in the Brady trilogy can be found in Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorne, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1

(1975).
30 See notes 56-59 & accompanying text infa.
31 The discussion of this point in this section will focus on the quality of the assistance of
defense counsel. Waiver theory as applied to guilty pleas is extensively discussed in the text
accompanying notes 145-65 infra.
32 404 U.S. at 260-61.
33 397 U.S. 742.
34 Id. at 758. See text accompanying notes 186-89 in/ta for Justice White's explanation of
this point.
35 Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining,36 U. GHI. L. REV. 50, 58-60 (1968).
Alschuler relied on his own informal survey of prosecutors and on a Universty of Pennsylvania
Law Review study which found that the strength of the state's case was considered important
by 85% of the prosecutors questioned. Note, Guity Plea Bargaining: Compromisesby Prosecutorsto
Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 901 (1964).
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ecutor, and often the defense counsel, assumes throughout the plea negotiations that the defendant is guilty of a crime very nearly
approximating that charged in the original indictment. 36 The prosecutor simply bargains harder where his case against the defendant is
weaker. Professor Alschuler noted this practice of offering more concessions in bargaining where the state's case is weaker and commented that
"the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants
who may be innocent. The universal rule is that the sentence differential between guilty plea and trial defendants increases in direct proportion to the likelihood of acquittal. '37 Prosecutors disagree that innocent
people plead guilty, principally because they believe that innocent persons are unlikely to be swayed by any pressure to avoid trial. 38
The defendant seeks to avoid risk in that his principal objective
39
after arrest is to minimize the uncertainty of what will happen to him.
The defendant will therefore be willing to accept the certainty of a low
sentence or probation rather than risk a trial where the statutory maximum sentence might be imposed upon conviction. 40 This observation is
supported by Michael Finkelstein's empirical study of guilty plea practices in twenty-nine federal district courts, in which he concluded that
nearly one-third of defendants who plead guilty would be found innocent if they stood trial.4 ' Therefore, while plea negotiation is a viable
36 M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES AND

DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 100 (1970). Overcharging with an eye toward reducing the charge to
the crime the prosecutor believes the defendant has committed is common in state and federal
plea negotiations. "Vertical" overcharging, more common in state courts, is where the defendant is charged with the most serious crime he conceivably could have committed. "Horizontal" overcharging, more often found in federal courts, may be a multiplicitous indictment
that comes within statutory bounds. An offer to reduce charges or to dismiss charges against
a defendant is a more effective guarantee of sentencing leniency, where there are statutory
minimum and maximum sentences, than is the prosecutor's promise to make a sentencing
recommendation. Alschuler (1968), supra note 35, at 85-105.
37 Alschuler (1969), supra note 35, at 60.
38 M. HEUMANN, supra note 36, at 122-23.
39 D. NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 97; Alschuler, The TalJudge r Role inPlea Bargaining, 76
COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1081 n.72 (1976).
40 With regard to sentencing disparities between defendants accused of similar crimes, the
more demands a defendant makes upon the resources and time of both judge and prosecutor,
the longer his sentence will be upon conviction. Thus a guilty pleading defendant will be
sentenced more leniently than one who stands trial before the bench, who will in turn be
punished less severely than his unfortunate counterpart who demands a jury trial. See Alschuler (1976), supra note 39, at 1089-99.
41 Finkelstein, A StatisticalAnalysis of Guilty Plea Practicesin the Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L.
REV. 293 (1975). This analysis concerns the defendant's chances of being found innocent at
trial, regardless of his actual guilt or innocence. By assuming what he called an "implicit rate
of non-conviction" representing the proportion of guilt pleading defendants who would have
been acquitted had they stood trial, Finkelstein estimated that one-third of all guilty pleading
defendants in districts with high rates of guilty pleas would have been found innocent had
they stood trial. Id at 309.
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alternative to the risks of trial for both sides, it is not a substitute for
trial. A plea of guilty does not mean that a like result would be obtained at trial. The Court's equation of guilty plea with conviction at
trial is thus unrealistic.
The Court's second problematic assumption is that a plea is voluntarily and intelligently entered if counsel is present. 42 In the Brad trilogy of cases, the Court framed the issue as whether a guilty plea induced
by a coerced confession, 43 or by the possible imposition of the death
penalty, 44 is voluntary and intelligent if the defendant has received the
assistance of counsel. The basic flaw in the Court's position, according
to one observer, is the assumption that defense aLttorneys always have
their clients' best interests in mind,45 an opinion which reflects an unduly optimistic view of "the range of competence demanded of attorneys
' 46
in criminal cases.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Mc~lann v.Richardson47 articulates a different view that is closer to reality. His dissent implies that the defense
attorney finds that his own best interests are usually furthered if he encourages his clients to plead guilty. Since the defense attorney works
with the same prosecutors and the same judges on a continuing basis, he
finds that cooperation with a prosecutor who wants to deal, or a judge
who wants to avoid trial, is more to his continuing advantage than affording an individual defendant the full measure of vigorous advocacy.4 8 Perhaps the most appalling feature of this cooperative system is

the reluctance of the defense attorney who has a good working relationship with the prosecutor's office and the court to press any constitutional
claims that the defendant might have except as bargaining chips to ob49
tain concessions in plea negotiations.
42 Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-69 (1973); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S.
at 794-98; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 768-74; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at

756-58. See Alschuler, The Defense Aionmys Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).
43
44
45

Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 794; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 760.
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 794; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 749.
Alschuler (COLO. 1975), supra note 29, at 22; Alschuler (YALE 1975), supra note 42, at

1180.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 771.
Id at 775-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
[In the two prior cases in the Brady trilogy] the Court lays great stress upon the ability of
counsel to offset the improper influence injected into the pleading processes by the
46
47

State's unconstitutional action . .

.

. [t]he conclusions that the Court draws from the

role it assigns to counsel are, in my view, entirely incorrect, for it cannot be blandly
assumed, without further discussion, that counsel will be able to render effective assistance to the defendant in freeing him from the burdens of his unconstitutionally extorted
confession.
Id at 781 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48 Alschuler (1968), supra note 35, at 47-91; Alschuler (YALE 1975), supra note 42, at 1210.
See M. HEUMANN, supra note 36, at 47-91.
49 Alschuler (1968), supra note 35, at 79-81.
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Moreover, a defense attorney who knows of a weakness in the prosecutor's case against his client can use this knowledge to obtain concessions in plea bargaining. The prosecutor's power to withhold evidence
or deny discovery privileges to the defense becomes crucial where his
case is flawed, because he has an incentive to conceal the flaw in order to
obtain a guilty plea. On the other hand, a prosecutor with a strong case
will find that opening his file to the defense will encourage a guilty plea.
Professor Alschuler noted that opportunities for preplea discovery
were conditioned not only upon the strength of the state's case,5 0 but
also upon defense counsel's rapport with the prosecutor's office, 5' and
upon concessions by defense counsel, such as divulging his client's confi53
dences 52 or agreeing that what he discovers will not be used at trial.
Other observers agree with this description of informal discovery practices. 54 Alschuler concludes that these circumstances provide a rationale
for granting broad defense discovery as a matter of right in order to
prevent these questionable practices. 55
The consequences of the failure of a prosecutor to disclose material
and favorable evidence prior to the entry of a guilty plea are magnified
because the trial judge is unlikely to discern exculpating circumstances
in assessing the validity of the plea. Given his tremendous workload, the
trial judge is just as interested in disposing of cases by guilty plea as is
the prosecutor. He is, therefore, not especially disposed to giving every
guilty plea the "penetrating and comprehensive examination" 56 con57
templated by the Court in Boykin v. Alabama.
Guilty pleas are usually heard in a very short session in which the
50 Alschuler (YALE 1975), sutra note 42, at 1227-28.
51 Id at 1225.
52 Id at 1226.
53 Id at 1227.
54 Uviller, Pleading Guily: A Critique of Four Modir, 41 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 102
(1977). Professor Uviller termed this bargained exchange "informal discovery," and found
that the degree of defense discovery permitted by the prosecutor depended upon the strength
of the state's case and the defense attorney's relationship with the prosecutor. Id at 113-14.
55 Although most defense attorneys do seem able to secure relatively broad informal
discovery in jurisdictions in which the right for discovery is extremely limited, some defendants suffer because their attorneys are not sufficiently trusted by the prosecutor's
office to receive the usual privileges. In addition, the absence of a formal right of discovery seems to impose pressures upon defense attorneys to defend their clients less vigorously than they could.
Alschuler (YALE 1975), supra note 42 , at 1229. Professor Alschuler is entirely opposed to plea
bargaining but argues for broader defense discovery as a means of mitigating the unfairness of
the practice.
56 Alschuler (1976), supra note 39, at 1114.
57 395 U.S. 238. Boykin is generally regarded as requiring that the defendant be made
aware of his rights regarding self-incrimination, jury trial, and confrontation. One interpretation of Bqykin is that a specific set of admonitions is required. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch.
1 10A, §402 (1979). The other interpretation is that BQykin only requires an adequate record
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judge asks the defendant a set of ritual questions to which he receives a
series of monosyllabic answers. Moreover, the trial judge is unlikely ever
to be confronted with any irregularity in the plea because the parties
have come to him with a prepared agreement, expecting no more than
his stamp of approval. As one commentator put it, "At this late stage in
the bargaining process, the interests of the prosecutor and defendant are
no longer adverse. Instead, they have a joint commitment to the success
of the plea bargain they have shaped. The parties therefore seek to present to the judge a facade of scrupulous regularity. ' 58 Thus the worst

fears of Justice Brennan in his dissent in McMann v.Richardson5 9 are
founded in fact. The trial judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney work together in the business of convicting defendants by means of
negotiated pleas. The Court misconstrues the defense attorney's role in
this cooperative system by presuming that representation by counsel ensures the voluntariness and intelligence of the defendant's plea of guilty.
Due in part to the Court's unrealistic assumption of fairness in plea
negotiation, the plea bargaining defendant has little in the way of procedural protection. 6° While the Court made great strides in criminal procedure during the Warren era, its decisions concerning guilty pleas have
had the effect of sequestering the negotiated plea from later collateral
attack. 6 ' Permeating the Court's opinions in the Brad trilogy62 are the
notions that all defendants who plead guilty surely would be convicted
at trial, and that the presence of defense counsel mitigates against unconstitutional pressures to plead guilty.
As the discussion of informal discovery during plea negotiation
showed, the extent of informal discovery privileges accorded the defense
for the plea, rather than specific admonitions. Hansen v. Matthews, 424 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1057 (1970).
Theoretically, an adequate record of a valid plea indicates that the defendant has knowledge of the charge and its elements, Kennedy v. United States, 249 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1957),
afd, 259 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 994 (1959), and of his sentence, United
States ex reL Hill v. United States, 452 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1971); Malignaro v. Smith, 408 F.2d
795 (5th Cir. 1969), and that he has responded affirmatively to the trial judge's inquiries,
People v. Kirkpatrick, 22 Cal. App. 3d 420, 99 Cal. Rptr. 207 (1971). Moreover, the defendant's awareness of possible defenses contributes to the invalidity of the plea. Quijada-Gaxiola
v. United States, 435 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 447 (3rd Cir. 1965); Young v. Brewer, 190 N.W.2d 434 (Iowa 1971).
58 Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE LJ.286, 307 n.68 (1972).
59 397 U.S. at 775-89. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
60 Plea agreements are enforceable. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357; Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63; Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257.
61 Alschuler (1979), supra note 9, at 37; Tigar, Foreword- Waiver of ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARv.L. REv. 1, 19-23 (1970).
62 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759; Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742. See text accompanying notes 186-89 hifra.
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depends on a number of factors. 63 Chief among these factors appears to
be the strength of the state's case against the defendant. The prosecutor's file is open if it will encourage a guilty plea. The prosecutor's ability to grant and withhold discovery privileges in this manner
demonstrates that the level of disclosure to the defense profoundly affects the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial.
The next section will examine the protections accorded the guilty pleading defendant by the Court's decisions on prosecutorial disclosure and
by the formal discovery rules of state and federal jurisdictions.
III.

PREPLEA DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE

Pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the prosecution,
whether pursuant to the prosecutor's duty under Brady v. Mgland64 or
applicable statutes and court rules permitting defense discovery, is an
area where due process safeguards are not always enforceable because
the discovery process is informal. 65 This section will discuss two questions. First, to what extent does the Brady-Agprs standard of materiality
afford the guilty pleading defendant the right to preplea prosecutorial
disclosure of potentially useful evidence? Second, will the adoption of
formal statutory and court rules permitting broad defense discovery of
the prosecution's case assure compliance with the Brady-Agurs principle?
A.

THE PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO DISCLOSE

In Brady v. Maeland,6 6 Brady was charged with murder in the commission of a felony. Admitting his participation in the felony, Brady
asserted that his companion Boblit did the actual shooting. Therefore,
his counsel requested all of Boblit's statements. The prosecutor supplied
the defense with all statements except Boblit's confession of the shooting.
At trial, Brady was convicted and sentenced to death.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Maryland Court of Appeals' reversal of Brady's conviction. 67 In establishing a new rule governing
prosecutorial disclosure, the Court stated: "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
63 See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
64 373 U.S. 83.
65 [C]ontrolled by rules of law protecting adversary rights and procedures, the process
at other stages is thoroughly unstructured. Beside the carefully guarded fairness of the
courtroom is a dark no-man's land of unreviewed bureaucratic and discretionary decision making. Too often, what the processpurports to secure in itsformal stages can be subverted or
dilutedat its more informal stages.
United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
66 373 U.S. 83.
67 The Maryland court remanded on the sentencing issue only. Brady v. State, 226 Md.
App. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961). The Supreme Court concurred with this view. 373 U.S. at
90.
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request violates due process where the evidence is material either to the
guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." 68 On its face, the Brady rule seems straightforward. The
rule departed from the Court's prior intentional suppression cases6 9 by
alleviating the need to consider the prosecutor's intent to suppress evidence. Read in accordance with the facts of Brada, the rule states that
the prosecutor must disclose favorable, material evidence upon receiving
70
a specific request for particular pieces of evidence from the defense.
Material evidence is defined as evidence which would create a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. 7' The Court based its decision on
the due process clause, 72 reasoning that a criminal defendant cannot
have a fair trial if he is prejudiced by the withholding of material evidence in his favor.
Lower courts inconsistently applied Brady v. Magland's specific request 73 and materiality 74 requirements for thirteen years before the
Court attempted to explain Brady in United Slates v. Agurs. 5 In Agurs,
the Court categorized situations demanding the application of the Brady
rule where the defense made a specific request, a general request, or no
request at all. 76 A general request for material and favorable evidence,
77
the Court stated, is the functional equivalent of no request at all.
If there is a duty to respond to a general request ... it must derive from

the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the
prosecutor. But if the evidence is so clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution notice of
a duty to produce, that duty
78
should equally arise if no request is made.
68 373 U.S. at 87.
69 See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957);
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
70 A comprehensive analysis of the historical origins of the prosecutor's duty to disclose
can be found in Note, The Prosecutor'sConstitutionalDuy to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74
YALE LJ. 136, 137-42 (1964).
71 See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
72 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
73 Some courts construed the prosecutor's duty to disclose liberally so as to override the
specific request requirement. See, e.g., Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96-102 (1967) (Fortas,
J., concurring); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). See-also note 82 infra.
74 Lower courts have determined the materiality of withheld evidence by asking whether
it would have changed the trial result. "Lower court opinions often read as if the judge has
first made up his mind as to the defendant's guilt and then simply decided the materiality
issue accordingly." Comment, Brady v. Ma~ylandand the Posecutor' Duty to Disclose, 40 U. C1.
L. REv. 112, 128 (1972). See aso Comment, supra note 16, at 216.
75 427 U.S. 97.
76 Most challenges to pleas of guilty on the grounds of a Brad violation involve situations

where a general request or no request was made; hence only the pertinent portions of the
Agurs opinion will be discussed here.
77 427 U.S. at 106-07.
78 id at 107.
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Thus the Court imposed a high standard of materiality upon a defendant alleging prosecutorial withholding after he has entered a general
request for material and favorable evidence or has made no request. In
such situations, the standard of materiality is whether the withheld evi79
dence would have created a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
The conviction stands if the defendant fails to make this showing.
No Supreme Court decision addresses the right of the guilty pleading defendant to preplea prosecutorial disclosure of material and
favorable evidence. Assuming the usual case of the defendant who,
prior to entering a guilty plea, has made a general request for Brad
material or no request at all, the question becomes whether the standard
of materiality demanded by United States v. Agurs should be required of
the guilty pleading defendant, or whether a lower standard of materiality is more appropriate. Agurs can be applied in two ways to this situation of the usual guilty pleading defendant. First, the standard of
whether the evidence creates reasonable doubt of guilt can be applied.
Second, Agurs may be construed to call for a sliding scale of standards
for diffferent classes of defendants.
The reasonable doubt standard of materiality has often been applied by lower courts faced with postconviction challenges to guilty
pleas based on Brady violations.8 0 However, this standard is impossible
to apply where there has not been a trial. An appellate judge can only
decide whether the undisclosed evidence creates a reasonable doubt of
guilt if he can consider it in light of all the other evidence. Because
there has been no trial, none of the evidence has been adequately developed or tested. In essence, the reviewing court applying the reasonable
doubt standard is trying the case for the first time. Thus the defendant's
constitutional claims are being determined by an exercise in judicial
hindsight.
Moreover, the reasonable doubt standard is too vigorous a standard
to be imposed on a defendant who chooses to forego the procedural safe79 [I]f the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist,
constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt
whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new
trial.
Id at 112-13 (footnote omitted).
80 See, e.g., United States v. Wolczik, No. 76-245 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 1979); Fambo v.
Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), affid per can'am 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977); People v.
Gott, 43 Ill. App. 3d 137, 356 N.E.2d 1102 (1976); Exparte Lewis, No. 60,645 ('ex. Grim.
May 30, 1979), afdwithout opinion sub nom. Lewis v. State, 600 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. Crim. 1980).
Perhaps a quest for certainty in the application of the prosecutor's duty to disclose has engendered this literal reading of Agurs. A desire for certainty in the test for which evidence is
material should not, however, blind courts to the rationale underlying the duty to disclose
which is fairness to the defendant.
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guards of a trial. Indeed, this standard may be too harsh even for a
defendant who has had a trial and later asserts a Brady violation. Justice
Fortas articulated this position in his concurring opinion in Giles v. Mar,land.81 Arguing for an expansive interpretation of the materiality requirement, he stated:
The State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible,
truth emerges. This is also the ultimate statement of its responsibility to
provide a fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. No respectable interest of the State is served by its concealment of information which is material,
generously conceived, to the case,
82
including all possible defenses.
Justice Fortas went on to qualify his statement by saying that the nondisclosure of evidence which is merely cumulative or repetitious should
not be grounds for setting aside a conviction. 8 3 Clearly, Justice Fortas'
concern was whether the prosecution or the reviewing court might miss
some piece of evidence which would be useful to the defense.8 4 Hence
Justice Fortas would interpret the Brady v. Magland rule in a way that
would best prevent prejudice to the defendant, rather than in terms of
meeting stringent materiality requirements. The application of the reasonable doubt standard to the guilty pleading defendant asserting a
Brady violation after entering a general request or no request is so harsh
that the purpose of the Brady rule, fairness to the defendant, is frustrated.
Under the second approach to materiality determination, Agurs can
be read as calling for a sliding scale of standards of materiality for differ85
ent classes of defendants rather than as imposing strict requirements.
All convicted criminal defendants who assert that the prosecutor withheld material and favorable evidence can be placed on a continuum of
81 386 U.S. at 96-102 (Fortas, J., concurring).

82 Id at 98. Justice Fortas also argued against the specific request requirement, an argument best articulated in Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842: "In gauging the nondisclosure in
terms of due process, the focus must be on the essential fairness of the procedure and not on
the astuteness of either counsel." Id at 846.
83 One commentator agrees that the line should be drawn here, stating:
Fairness requires that the defendant be given favorable evidence of any probative value
on the question of guilt or punishment, whether relevant to building a defense or to
undermining the prosecutor's case. . . . [W]henever the prosecutor has failed to disclose
relevant information to the defense, the courts should not hesitate to find error. This
does not necessarily mean that a conviction need be reversed when the prosecutor has
innocently overlooked truly insignificant bits of evidence.
Comment, supra note 74, at 132.
84 386 U.S. at 99 (Fortas J., concurring).
85 [T]he significance of Agurs is that a court or prosecutor can rank-order the defendant's burden of proving unfairness according to the situation in which a particular non-

disclosure occurred. That is, the majority opinion can be interpreted as a means of
comparing "how much" a defendant must prove in order to establish materiality in accordance with the circumstances under which the nondisclosure occurred.
Note, Dicovery-Prosecutor'sFailureto Disclose, 67 J. CRIM. L. & C. 408, 414 (1976).
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required showings of materiality. Those convicted at trial would be
held to the high standards of materiality required by Agurs in the specific request, general request, and no request categories. Those convicted by pleas of guilty would be ranked among themselves according
to the three request categories. No guilty pleading defendant, however,
would be held to the standards that Agurs requires of defendants who
stood trial, because a plea conviction involves a waiver of the right to
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the standard of materiality should be lower in all cases where there has been a plea conviction
because neither side has had the opportunity to present evidence.
A lower standard of materiality for guilty pleading defendants
would encompass evidence that relates to the defendant's decision
whether to plead or to stand trial, even though the evidence may not
necessarily constitute traditional Brady material. Because the BradyAgurs standard of materiality is based on the notion that the withheld
evidence would have affected the trial outcome, the standard presumes
that the question of whether to go to trial has already been answered.
Therefore, "traditional" Brady material and favorable evidence is exculpatory evidence. This includes evidence related to an element of the
offense,8 6 to a legal excuse,8 7 or a justification for the crime, or to an
illegal search and seizure of evidence. 88 Courts have found Brady violations where evidence relating to these examples was not disclosed to defendants who later entered pleas of guilty.89
Certain types of evidence, however, are highly pertinent to an informed decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial, yet would not
be cognizable as Brady material under the Agurs reasonable doubt standard. Evidence of the defendant's incompetence to stand trial9° would
fit into this category. Incompetency is more easily recognized at a trial,
which can be suspended for a competency hearing, than at a brief arraignment where a plea is entered. Similarly, evidence, which for trial
purposes would be termed "tactical" or "merely cumulative," may be
important to the defendant and his counsel when making a choice between a guilty plea and a trial. Since this choice is essentially a strategic
decision, the withholding of strategic evidence should be cognizable as a
Brady violation. Examples of tactical evidence affecting the decision to
plead include information that the complaining witness had died, 9 ' or
86 Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590.
87 Clements v. Coiner, 299 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. W. Va. 1969); Exparte Lewis, No. 60,645

('ex. Crim. May 30, 1979).
88 Zacek v. Brewer, 241 N.W.2d 41 (Iowa 1976).
89 See notes 86-88 supra.
90 Evans v. Kropp, 254 F. Supp. 218 (E.D. Mich. 1966); axparte Lewis, No. 60,645.
91 People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76,375 N.E.2d 41,404 N.Y.S.2d 85, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846
(1978).
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information which .would aid the defense in impeaching the credibility
92
of a prosecution witness at trial.
Nonetheless, a standard of materiality that calls for disclosure of all
evidence relating to the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or
stand trial is indefinite and difficult to apply. This standard could open
the doors to every defendant seeking to set aside his guilty plea on the
ground that some trivial piece of information was withheld. Furthermore, this standard could be construed to require the prosecutor to sort
through all of the largely neutral and irrelevant information in his files
in order to find evidence which would affect a decision to plead.
Yet a lower standard of materiality mandating disclosure of evidence directly affecting the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty
or stand trial is a logical extension of the Brady principle. In the context
of a trial, the prosecutor must disclose Brady material no later than at
trial.93 Most defendants never find out that material and favorable evidence has been withheld. 94 Disclosure of such evidence must precede
the defendant's act of self-conviction 95 if his guilty plea is to be the product of an informed choice between self-conviction and trial. It is not
sufficient that the defendant entering a plea merely be aware that he is
waiving certain rights. Preplea disclosure of evidence directly affecting
the decision to plead guilty would ensure that a guilty plea is an intelligent waiver of the defendant's right to trial. The possible difficulties in
applying this standard, especially from the standpoint of the prosecutor,
raise the question whether broad privileges of defense discovery would
not be an easier way to achieve the same result.
B.

PREPLEA DISCOVERY

The Brad rule is not a rule of discovery, nor does it demand that
there be any defense discovery at all.9 6 The rule simply states that the
prosecutor must disclose material and favorable evidence to the defense
92 State v. Pitts, 249 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
93 The Supreme Court has never decided the optimal time for the disclosure of Brady

material, but disclosure must be made no later than at trial. Comment, supra note 16, at 217.
94 Nakell, supra note 13, at 453.
95 At least one court disagrees. United States v. Wolczik, No. 76-245. "The rule of Brad,
.... It is not a rule of
v. Ma landis founded on the constitutional requirement of a fair trial
discovery ....
Thus, a defendant cannot expect to obtain Brady material for use in a pretrial decision to plead guilty."
96 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 92; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83. Significantly,
Justice Stevens reiterated the Court's position that the defendant has no right to broad discovery of the prosecutor's case, and that the prosecutor need not open his file to the defendant. 427 U.S. at 109. This position was previously espoused in Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786, 792 (1972).
"Many authorities have announced without analysis that there is no constitutional right
to defense discovery. The United States Supreme Court has strongly favored defense discov-
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before trial. The question to be discussed in this section is whether the
adoption of procedural rules permitting broad defense discovery would
ensure compliance with the Brady rule.
Generally, criminal discovery for the defense has several perceived
advantages. Given the greater investigative resources of the prosecutor,
defense discovery equalizes the strategic contest between the prosecution
and the defense. 97 In addition, defense discovery may encourage guilty
pleas, 98 reduce the number of motions requesting information,9 9 and
generally impute a measure of fairness to pretrial processes that are determinative of the outcome of the formal proceedings. Arguments that
defense counsel will use the discovered evidence to fabricate a defense, 1° ° and that the defense should not be able to engage in a "fishing
expedition,"' 10 ' have been largely discredited.
Since Brady v. Maygland, many commentators have advocated a pretrial "open file" policy on the part of the prosecution to ensure that the
defendant's right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable
evidence is observed. 10 2 Efforts to increase pretrial defense discovery are
directed at the problem of "negligent nondisclosure."'10 3 Because the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor in failing to turn over material
and favorable evidence to the defense is irrelevant under the Brady
ery, but the Court's development of constitutional procedures to deliver it has been measured." Nakell, supra note 13, at 451 (footnotes omitted).
97 Note, Implementing Brady v.Mayland.. An Argument for a PretrialOpen File Policy, 43 U.
CIN. L. REv. 889, 890 (1974); Note, supra note 70, at 142-43.
98 Note, supra note 97, at 908. "[T]here may be an increase in guilty pleas when there is
disclosure of implicating evidence (not within the parameters of Brady) as well as favorable
evidence." Id
99 Id

tO0 What may be seen as a last stand for this argument can be found in In re DiJoseph, 394
Pa. 19, 28-31, 145 A.2d 187, 190-92 (1958) (Bell, J., dissenting).
The possibility that a dishonest accused will misuse such an opportunity is no reason for
committing the injustice of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself.
That argument is outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic) for the one-time refusal of the criminal law to allow the accused to produce any witnesses at all.
6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1863, at 488 (3d ed. 1940).
tot There is no persuasive reason why he [the defendant] should not be allowed to go on
a "fishing expedition" for information as long as he does not fish for the prosecution's
work product. In many cases the defendant-particularly if he is innocent--may have
little or no idea what information the prosecution might have. . . . That is precisely
why he needs discovery.
Nakell, supra note 13, at 475.
t02 See, e.g., Nakell, supra note 13; Comment, supra note 74; Note, supra note 97; Comment,
PreplaDiscovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 527
(1971).
103 Note, supra note 97, at 909. The author observed that most Brady violations that are
appealed are the result of negligence on the part of the prosecution, rather than intentional
suppression. For an analysis, of some examples of negligent nondisclosure cases, see Nakell,
supra note 13, at 452-60.
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rule, 0 4 the Court was obviously concerned with negligent nondisclosure
in formulating the rule. Addressing the negligent nondisclosure problem, one commentator has argued that broad defense discovery is mandated because the prosecutor should not be entrusted with the
determination of which evidence must be furnished to the defendant
under Brady v. Magyland. 0 5
The prosecutor should be relieved of responsibility for disclosure by
means of liberal defense discovery for several reasons. The prosecutor's
integrity has nothing to do with the negligent nondisclosure problem. 06
First, the demands of the prosecutor's workload and his role as an advocate make him unable to search his files for every piece of evidence that
conceivably could be material and favorable to the defendant. If the
prosecutor only moves to indict defendants that he believes can be
proved guilty, 0 7 then he may decide close questions of materiality and
favorableness in favor of nondisclosure) 0 8 Thus, his posture, heavy
caseload, and massive files mean that total compliance with the Brady
rule is expensive for the prosecutor in terms of time.
Second, the prosecutor cannot, and should not, be expected to prepare the defendant's case for him. He cannot be expected to view the
evidence according to its usefulness to the defense because his posture as
prosecutor gives him a biased view of the evidence. 10 9 Moreover, if the
prosecutor is unfamiliar with defense counsel's theory of the case, he is
unlikely to appreciate the strategic value of seemingly neutral information.1 10
Two practitioners, Zagel and Carr, have argued that the problem
of the prosecutor's inability to appreciate the defense value of information in his file can be alleviated by reciprocal discovery."' They assert
that in instances where the materiality and favorableness of the evidence
is in doubt, the prosecutor cannot decide whether to produce the evi104 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83. When material and favorable evidence is withheld,
the prosecutor is cast "in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with
standards of justice, even though ... his action is not 'the result of guile'. ... " Id at 88
(citations omitted).
105 Nakell, upra note 13, at 435-60. See also Note, supra note 97, at 895-900.
106 See note 105 supra; both authors agree that cases of intentional suppression are rare and
easily dealt with on appeal.
107 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
108 Note, supra note 97, at 889 n.57.
109 Id at 896.
110 Nakell, supra note 13, at 458. There is disagreement on the merits of the trial judge

performing this function. Professor Nakell argues against it on the ground that the trial judge
knows even less about the defense counsel's case than does the prosecutor. Id at 460-61.
11" Zagel & Carr,State CyiminalDiscoveryandthe New Illinois Rules, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 557, 562
(1971). At the time they wrote this article, Zagel and Carr were members of the Criminal
Justice Division of the Illinois Attorney General's Office.

COMMENTS

[Vol. 72

dence unless he has gained knowledge of the defense theories through
discovery against the defense. Zagel and Carr further observe that defense discovery may serve to ensure that an adequate basis exists for a
112
plea of guilty.
Nonetheless, broad defense discovery cannot be regarded as a panacea in implementing the Brady rule in the guilty plea context, nor in
ensuring that pleas of guilty are intelligently entered. As Zagel and
Carr point out:
A prosecutor acting in good faith, however, will comply with Brad even
without discovery. If the prosecutor is not acting in good faith, he can hide
the evidence even if there is discovery. Compliance with Brady cannot be
compliance will depend
secured by courtroom procedure alone; ultimately
1 13
on the good faith of law enforcement personnel.
The extent to which procedural rules affording the defense discovery
privileges may be undermined during plea negotiations is not known.
However, as the discussion of plea bargaining in the previous section
showed, a logical inference can be made that some dilution of discovery
privileges is taking place during plea negotiation, given the extent of
14
prosecutorial control over informal discovery.'
1 15 Illinois,'" 6 New Jersey,' 17
At the time of this writing, California,
Florida,' 18 and to some extent the amended Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure 19 provide the defense with broad privileges to discover items
of prosecution evidence such as the statements of the defendant, codefendants, and witnesses, 120 documentary and physical evidence, and experts' reports. Two recent cases that apply the Illinois and federal
discovery rules to guilty pleading defendants demonstrate that these
rules do not necessarily ensure compliance with the Brady rule.
112 Id
113 Id

at 562.
"The austere ambivalence that is commanded is beyond the capacity of anyone
who is also expected to perform an advocate's role." Nakell, supra note 13, at 457.
114 See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra.
115 California discovery process is not statutory but is the product ofjudicial decision on a
case-by-case basis; discovery is at the trial court's discretion on defense motion. Set Kane,
Criminal Discovey-The CircuitousRoad to a Two-Way Street, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 203 (1973); Shatz,
Calirnia Criminal Discovery. Eliminating Anachronistic Limitations Imposed on the Defendant, 9
U.S.F.L. REV. 259 (1974); Traynor, Ground Lost and Foundin CrimninalDiscovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 228 (1964); Note, The PreiminaryHearing in Calfornia: Adaptive Proceduresin a Plea Bargai
System of CriminalJustice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1207 (1976).
116 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, §412 (1979). See Zagel & Carr, supra note 111.
117 N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3. See Zagel & Carr, supra note 111, at 566-67.
118 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220. See Zagel & Carr, supra note 111, at 564-66.
119 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. See Comment, Amendments to the FederalRulesof CriminalProcedureExpansion of Discovery, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 23 (1975).
120 Disclosure of government witnesses' statements is governed by the complementary provisions of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 and the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1979).
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In People v. G-at,121 the defendant sought to withdraw his plea, alleging that the prosecutor withheld a codefendant's statements prior to
his entry of a guilty plea but later presented these statements at the
sentencing hearing. The defense had made a general request for discovery under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412.122 The court found that
while the codefendant's statements were inculpatory and therefore were
not Brady material, the prosecutor's failure to disclose this evidence violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(ii), which requires the prose123
cution to disclose all statements of codefendants on written motion.
In holding that the nondisclosure was harmless error, the court made no
12 4
mention of this violation of state discovery rules.
In United States v. Wolczik, 12s the defendant sought to vacate his
plea, asserting that he had been denied discovery of the written statements of his coconspirators. The Court denied relief because the Jencks
Act 126 and Rule 16127 preclude discovery of the statements of prospective government witnesses until they have testified at trial. The Court
further found that the statements were not Brady material because the
statements identified Wolczik as a coconspirator but did not exonerate
him.128 Nonetheless, the Court stated that if the statements were Brady
129
material, preplea disclosure arguably could be required.
Got and Wolczik demonstrate that even the most defense-oriented
discovery statutes to date do not necessarily act as enforcement mechanisms for the Brady rule. In both cases the courts held that the withheld
evidence was not Brady material. Only in ato would the application of
the relevant discovery statute have required the prosecutor to turn over
more evidence to the defense than required under the Agurs reasonable
30
doubt standard.'
Hence the guilty pleading defendant .is not afforded disclosure of
evidence directly affecting his choice between a plea and a trial by the
121 43 Ill. App. 3d 137, 356 N.E.2d 1102 (1976).
122 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 412 (1979).
123 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 412(a)(ii). This section provides in pertinent part: "[T]he
State shall, upon written motion of defense counsel, disclose to defense counsel . . . . any
written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the accused
or by a codefendant. .. ."
124 43 II. App. 3d at 142-43, 356 N.E.2d at 1106. See text accompanying notes 190-91
infra.
125 No. 76-245. Wolczik entered a guilty plea after agreeing to a plea bargain identical to
that offered his coconspirators.
126 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
127 FED. R. GRIM. P. 16(2).
128 See text accompanying notes 149-55 infa. United States v. Wolezik, No. 76-245.
Wolczik's motion to vacate his plea was denied.
129 Id
130 The

Illinois Supreme Court applied the reasonable doubt standard in this case. People
v. Gott, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 142, 356 N.E. 2d at 1106. See text accompanying notes 190-91 infra.
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most liberal defense discovery provisions any more than he is afforded
such disclosure under the standards delineated in Agurs. Insofar as the
trial defendant is concerned, these defense discovery provisions probably
have served their purpose of alleviating the prosecutor's burden of compliance with the Brad rule. The guilty pleading defendant, however, is
not greatly aided by these provisions where they do not encompass evidence beyond that required to be disclosed under the reasonable doubt
standard.
In the majority of jurisdictions, defense discovery privileges are subject to judicial discretion, 3 1 and the defense is required to make some
showing of "need," 13 2 "materiality," "reasonableness," 13 3 "good
cause," 13 4 or some combination of these. State and federal discovery
procedures, as presently administered, are neither intended nor enforced
to aid the defendant in making an informed decision whether to plead
guilty or stand trial.
IV.

APPLICATION OF BR4DY V. MA.RYL,4ND TO PLEA CONVICTIONS

A guilty plea operates as a waiver of the defendant's right to trial
and its attendant constitutional safeguards. I 35 Therefore, a plea must
satisfy the constitutional standards for waiver, which the Court in Johnson v. Zerbst 136 defined as "ordinarily an intentional relinquishment of a
known right or privilege."' 137 Four models can be used to explain when
a guilty plea should be set aside for a violation of Brady v. Magland
rights. 138 First, under the traditional concept of waiver, prosecutorial
withholding of Brady material renders a guilty plea unintelligent.3 9
E.g., DEL. SUPER. CT. GRIM. R. 16; ME. R. GRIM. P. 16(a); PA. R. CRIM. P. 310; TEX.
art. 39.14; VT. R. GRIM. P. 16.
166 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1969) (defendant must show a particularized
need for witness statements).
133 E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3212(2) (1974) (defendant must show materiality and reasonableness of request to discover physical evidence); MD. R. CRIM. P. 728 (defendant must
show materiality and reasonableness of request to discover own statements).
'34 E.g., MONT. REv. CODE ANN. § 95-1801(d) (1969) (defendant must show good cause to
discover witness statements).
135 Among these rights are the right to jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), the privilege against self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the right
to confront one's accusers, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), the right to proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), and the right to obtain witnesses in one's favor, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). For other rights and privileges
of lesser importance waived by a guilty plea, see Bishop, supra note 2.
136 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
137 304 U.S. at 464. "Almost without exception the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a
criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 237 (1973).
138 373 U.S. 83.
139 The issue of the voluntariness of the plea is not relevant here because (a) the concept of
131

CODE GRIM. PRO. ANN.
132 E.g., State v. Eads,
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Second, a guilty plea constitutes a forfeiture of Brady v. Magland rights
140
because of the state's interest in the finality of plea convictions.
Third, because plea acceptance procedures generally require the judge
to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea, 14 1 the prosecutor's withholding of certain types of exculpatory evidence could erode
the factual basis for the plea. Fourth, the due process right conferred by
Brady v. Magland can be equated with several rights 142 that are neither
waived nor forfeited by a plea of guilty.
A.

REQUIREMENT OF AN INTELLIGENT PLEA

The first model states that prosecutorial withholding of material
and favorable evidence renders a subsequent plea of guilty unintelligent.
43
This concept conflicts with a trend exemplified by the Brady trilogy
and Tollett v. Henderson, 144 which one commentator has characterized as
an erosion of the concept of voluntary and intelligent waiver. 145 With
the undue emphasis placed on the presence of counsel during plea negotiation in the Brad trilogy and To//eU,'4 6 an intelligent plea apparently
need involve little more than knowledge on the part of the defendant of
the charge and the sentence and an awareness that he is foregoing a
trial.
These four decisions make a counseled plea virtually immune from
collateral attack on traditional waiver grounds. The standard of knowing and intelligent waiver adopted by the Court is sufficiently low as to
"involuntary" seems to be clearly defined as that which is induced by threats, misrepresentation or other improper means, as espoused in Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2
(5th Cir. 1957), reo'don othergrounads, 356 U.S. 26 (1958), and later accepted by the Court in
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755, and (b) a Brady v. Magland violation affects the
defendant's ability to make an informed decision whether to plead guilty, hence it relates to
the inteligence of making the plea, rather than the defendant's willingness to enter a plea.
140 Westen, Away jrom Waiver: A Rationaleforthe Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights in Criminal
Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977). For a criticism of Professor Westen's arguments, see
Saltzburg, Pleas ofGuilty and the Loss of ConstitutionalRights: The Current Price of PleadingGuilty,
76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978). Westen replies to Saltzburg in Forfeitureby Guilty Plea-A
Reply, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1308 (1978).
141 E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e).
142 These include: the right to speedy trial, Westen, supra note 141, at 1226 n.6; the protection against double jeopardy, Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975); the right to challenge
the constitutionality of a substantive criminal law, Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975);
Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); and the due process right asserted in Blackledge
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21.
'43 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. at 797-98; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 770;
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757.
144 In Tollett, the Court stated, "A guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently entered may not
be vacated because the defendant was not advised of every conceivable constitutional plea-in
abatement he might have to the charge. . . ." 411 U.S. at 264.
145 Alschuler (CoLo. 1975), supra note 29, at 37-42.
146 See note 57 supra.
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validate a "plea in the dark,"' 147 as evinced by the Court in Brady v.

United States:
The rule that a plea must be intelligently made does not require that a
plea be vulnerable to later attack if the defendant did not correctly assess

every factor entering into his decision. A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea merely because he discovers long after the plea has been
case or
accepted that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the state's
148
the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action.

Thus the standard of waiver adopted by the Brady trilogy and Tollett, that a counseled plea is an intelligent plea, is a lower standard than
the traditional requirement of voluntary and intelligent waiver ofJohnson v. Zerbst. The Brady trilogy's lowered standard for waiver of constitutional rights by guilty pleading defendants has harsh effects on those
asserting a Brady v. Maland violation after a plea conviction. These
effects are demonstrated by United States v. Wolczik. 149 In that case,
Wolczik pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy in exchange for the
dismissal of three counts of receiving and possessing stolen bonds. He
sought to vacate his plea because the government had withheld the
statements of his coconspirators, who were to testify against him at
trial. 150 Quoting at length the language of Brady v. United States and
Tollett v. Henderson,'5' the district court held that considerations which
might have influenced the defendant's decision to plead guilty did not
negate the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea 15 2 unless he
could show that it was not competently counseled.' 53 Although the
court held that the statements withheld were not Brady v. Mayland material,154 given the court's use of such a low standard of knowing and intelligent waiver a finding that these statements were Brady material would
not have changed the result. 155 Because of its focus on the presence of
counsel, the Brady trilogy standard of waiver, as applied in Wolczik,
147 Comment, Oftial Inducements to Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals/ora Marketplace, 32 U.
CHI. L. REv. 167, 183 (1964).

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757.
No. 76-245. See text accompanying notes 125-29 supra.
150 These statements could not be discovered by the defense until the witnesses had testified under the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, but could be discovered if they were Brad material. See text accompanying note 129 supra.
151 The language quoted by the court was essentially the same as that quoted in the text
accompanying notes 144-48 supra. United States v. Wolczik, No. 76-245.
148

149

152 Id
153 Id
154 Coconspirator Adams' statement identified Wolczik as a conconspirator. One of coconspirator Martin's statements identified Wolczik as a coconspirator by his first name only;
Martin's other statement mentioned Wolczik but did not inculpate him. Although the court
held that the statements were simply "not exculpatory," there does seem to be a question as to
whether Martin's inconsistent statements constitute Brady material. Id
155 The court held that a defendant has no right to Brady material prior to entering a plea
of guilty. Id See note 95 supra.
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seems to ignore the extent of actual knowledge of facts and circumstances relevant to a defendant's decision to plead guilty. The rule of
Brady v. Magland and the standard of waiver adopted in the Brady trilogy thus are irreconcilable as applied to the guilty pleading defendant.
If the withholding of material and favorable evidence by the prosecutor
renders a subsequent plea of guilty unintelligent, the standard of voluntary and intelligent waiver used to gauge the validity of the plea must be
the traditional concept ofJohnson v. Zerbst.
Two state courts, however, have attempted to reconcile the
prosecutorial duty to disclose and the Brady trilogy concept of waiver by
holding that prosecutorial withholding of material and favorable evidence renders a guilty plea unintelligent because it detrimentally affects
56
defense counsel's ability to provide competent advice. In Lee v. State,'
157
the trial court denied the defendant's motion to vacate his sentence,
after he pleaded guilty to assault with intent to kill. Lee contended that
his plea was not knowingly and intelligently entered because the prosecutor failed to disclose evidence that the victim misidentified another
man at a lineup prior to the preliminary hearing at which she identified
Lee. Relying on a statement by the assistant prosecutor at the hearing
on Lee's motion to vacate that constituted a virtual confession of the
prosecution's mistake, 158 the Missouri Court of Appeals allowed the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, despite the state's reliance on the
Brady trilogy and Tollett for the proposition that a guilty plea waives
unknown rights and defenses. 159 The court granted that the plea would
be valid if defense counsel knew of the Brady violation prior to the entry
of the plea and had nonetheless effectively represented the defendant.16
Nevertheless, the court observed, the combination of the prosecutor's
573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. 1978).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 27.26 (Vernon 1953). This section allows a prisoner to move to
vacate his sentence on the ground that it violates the Constitution (or the state constitution or
laws), that the court lacked jurisdiction, or that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
158 At the defendant's rule 27.26 hearing, the assistant prosecutor testified:
I did feel that the facts of the misidentification should have been communicated to the
defense attorney because I do feel very strongly that the defense cannot recommend a
plea of guilty or discuss a plea of guilty with a defendant unless they are aware of factors
which might mitigate the case against their clients.
573 S.W.2d at 132.
159 An argument that "unknowable" rights cannot be waived by a guilty plea under the
156
157

traditional concept of waiver can be found in Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of 'Present But
Unknowable" Rights: The Aftermath of the Brad Trilog, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1435 (1974).

There can be no question but that a guilty plea is effective despite a prior violation
of the defendant's constitutional rights, provided the defendant and his counsel knew that
the violations had occurred and the violations had ceased to have any coercive effect at
the time the quality [sic] plea was entered. Also, it cannot be questioned that a guilty
plea is binding even though the defendant and his counsel were lacking in some information bearing upon the case, so long as that lack of information was not the result of
ineffective legal representation.
Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d at 134 (emphasis added).
160
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knowing suppression of exculpatory evidence and the fact that knowledge of that evidence at the time of the plea "reasonably would have led
61
the defendant not to so plead" called for the withdrawal of the plea.
The court based its decision on the defense attorney's need for an item of
material and favorable evidence that would have enabled him to provide the defendant with informed advice in the decision whether to
plead guilty.
Similarly, in Zacek v. Brewer,' 62 petitioner Zacek sought postconviction relief on the ground that his plea to second-degree murder was unintelligent. He argued that the state "artificially restricted" his choice
between a plea and trial because the police had willfully suppressed evidence of an illegal search of his home and seizure of shell casings that
matched the murder weapon.1 63 Zacek's attorneys had advised him to
plead guilty because they thought that he would be convicted of firstdegree murder if tried. At the postconviction hearing, however, one of
the attorneys testified that he never would have recommended a guilty
plea had he known that the evidence was illegally seized and thus inadmissible at trial. The Supreme Court of Iowa found that, under Tollett
and McMann, Zacek could not obtain relief for a preplea deprivation of
a constitutional right unless he could show that his counsel's advice was
not within the standards enunciated in those two cases.' 64 The court
found that the state's suppression of exculpatory evidence prevented defense counsel from becoming informed of the illegality of the search and
therefore prevented counsel from rendering effective assistance to the
5
defendant.16
The evidence withheld in Zacek and Lee was obviously exculpatory.
The courts need not have concerned themselves with the defense attorneys' inability to render advice to reach the results obtained. A simple
application of the Brad v. Maland rule to the facts of each case, even
with the Agurs reasonable doubt standard, would have brought about
the same result. The courts should not have taken the circuitous steps
that they took to relate plain violations of due process to the effectiveness of counsel. Although these steps were necessary to reconcile the
Brady trilogy standard of waiver with the prosecutorial duty to disclose,
they were inexpedient because the focus of the latter rule is on fairness
to the defendant and not on the presence of counsel in bargaining.
When the prosecutor unfairly withholds material and favorable evidence from the defense, the ripple effects that this action may have on
161 Id at 134-35.
162 241 N.W.2d 41.
163 Id

at 45.

164 Id at 50.
165 Id at 51-52. The case was remanded for an order to set aside the plea.
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defense counsel's efficacy are a foregone conclusion. Only if the courts
accept the proposition that a guilty plea waives all antecedent constitutional defects need the effect of such defects on defense counsel's advice
be considered. This argument, which will be discussed in the next section, is that the Brady trilogy was not based on the traditional concept of
waiver, and espouses a different concept of how the defendant relinquishes his rights by a plea of guilty.
B.

FORFEITURE BY PLEA

The second model states that the Brady trilogy does not represent
the traditional concept of waiver, but abandons the voluntary and intelligent waiver concept.16 Justice White, who wrote the trilogy opinions,
originated this argument. In his dissent in Lejkowitz v. Newsome,' 6 7 Justice White stated that the trilogy was not grounded in the Johnson v.
Zerbst theory of waiver, but rather in the idea that the defendant cannot
vacate his plea regardless of the constitutional violations that preceded
it, because a plea is a determination of factual guilt. 8 Justice White's
somewhat unorthodox view of the absolute finality of guilty pleas 169 is
the root of the second model, which states that a guilty plea may be seen
1 70
as aforfeiture of Brady v. Mat-land rights.
Based on Justice White's theory that a guilty plea cures all antecedent constitutional violations, Professor Westen has developed a model
for determining which rights are forfeited by a guilty plea. 17 1 This
model differentiates forfeiture from waiver. Forfeiture, in the sense of
involuntary relinquishment, is necessary where the state's interest in the
finality of the guilty plea outweighs the defendant's assertion of the
claimed right. Waiver, the traditional concept of a voluntary and intelligent decision to forego a right, applies where this balance tips in favor
172
of the defendant's assertion of the claimed right.
The starting point for Westen's model is the Brady trilogy 7 3 and
Tollett v. Henderson. 174 Professor Westen argues that the constitutional
166

Alschuler (COLO. 1975), sufra note 29, at 30-37; Westen, supra note 140; Note, sufira

note 159, at 1439-45.
167 420 U.S. 283 (1975). See Alschuler (COLO. 1975), sufra note 29, at 30-37; Westen, sufra
note 140, at 1232.
168 420 U.S. at 299 (White, J., dissenting).
169 Contra, Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. at 283 (majority opinion); Blackledge v. Perry,
417 U.S. 21.
170 The third argument, which is an extension of the second, holds that if a plea is to
function as a determination of factual guilt, then the nondisclosure of Brady material which
exculpates the defendant is grounds for setting the plea aside.
171 Westen, supra note 140.
172 Id at 1254-55.
173 Id at 1227 n.29.
174 A grand jury whose members included no one of the defendant's race could have been
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violations at issue in these cases were "curable" and therefore forfeited
by a guilty plea. Westen states his model as follows:
A defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty may challenge'his
conviction on any constitutional ground that, if asserted before trial, would
forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction against him,
regardless of how much the state might endeavor to correct the defect. In
of all defenses
other words, a plea of guilty may operate as a forfeiture
17 5
except those that, once raised, cannot be "cured.
Applying this model, Westen attempts to explain the Court's holdings in Blackledge v. Perry 176 and Menna v. New York 177 by arguing that the
constitutional rights at issue in those cases were not forfeitable because
they were not curable. In Blackledge v. Perry, the defendant had been
convicted at trial of a misdemeanor and exercised his statutory right to
trial de novo. In retaliation, the prosecutor filed a felony charge against
Perry for an included offense based on the same conduct. Perry pleaded
guilty to the felony charge and then sought postconviction relief for the
prosecutor's retaliatory move, asserting that he had been deprived of
due process. In Menna v. New York, the defendant pleaded guilty to contempt charges for refusing to testify before a grand jury. Menna was
later indicted for refusing to answer questions before the same grand
jury, and filed a double jeopardy claim. Professor Westen argues that
the incurability of the violation of the due process right to a statutory
trial de novo, and of the protection against double jeopardy, stems from
the fact that a violation of these rights prevents the state from ever obtaining a valid conviction.' 78 He relies on a statement in Blackledge v.
Perry that the claimed right goes "to the very power of the State to bring
179
the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him."'
Where does the right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and
favorable evidence, which is rooted in due process, fit into Westen's
scheme of differentiating those rights which are forfeited from those
rights which may be asserted after a guilty plea? The remedy for a failure to disclose Brady material no later than at trial is a new trial; thus
the state has the opportunity to obtain a conviction on the original
charge after providing the defendant with the evidence previously with"cured" by the state's obtaining a proper indictment from a racially balanced grand jury. Id
at 1226.
175 Id
176 417 U.S. 21.
177 423 U.S. 61.
178 Professor Westen's differentiation between curable and incurable constitutional viola-

tions may not hold up. Professor Saltzburg argues that the defect in Blackledge was curable in
that the prosecutor could have filed a charge that did not include Perry's misdemeanor, and
that the defect in Menna could have been cured by denominating the plea a civil contempt.
Saltzburg, supra note 140, at 1284-85 nn.89-91.
179 417 U.S. at 30.

1981]

DISCLOSURE AND THE BRADY TRILOGY

held. The state's chances of obtaining a conviction upon retrial will be
diminished by this evidence, but the power of the state to bring the
defendant into court on the original charge is in no way impaired.
Therefore, if Westen's model is applied to Brady v. Magland,180 the defendant's right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable evidence is forfeited by a guilty plea because a claim based on this right
does not "forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction."' 8 '
Such an argument, however logical, is purely academic. Surely no
judge would refuse to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea in the face
of a clear violation of the prosecutor's duty under Brady v. Magland.
There are no cases where, given these facts, a judge has refused to set
aside a plea by invoking Westen's argument that a Brady violation is an
antecedent constitutional violation of no consequence once the defendant has admitted his guilt.
A Florida intermediate appellate court, however, agreed with Westen's view until ordered to reverse itself by the highest court of the state.
In State v. Pitts,182 decided before Westen's article was written, the court
held that a guilty plea does not cure a Brady defect, reversing its own
prior decision that evidence tending to impeach the credibility of witnesses need not be disclosed prior to the entry of the defendants' guilty
pleas. The court's prior decision relied on the Brady trilogy for the no183
tion that a guilty plea waives all antecedent nonjurisdictional defects.
The theory that a defendant's right to collaterally assert a Brady
violation is forfeited by a guilty plea is logically appealing, but to deny a
defendant relief in this situation is patently unfair. The forfeiture theory would make the Brady v. Magland rule a nullity for the majority of
all convicted criminals because most convictions are obtained through
plea negotiations rather than trials.' 8 4 The harshness of Justice White's
180 See text accompanying note 175 supra. Neither Westen nor Saltzburg discusses Brady v.
Magland.
181 Westen, supra note 140, at 1226.
182 249 So. 2d at 49. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court
for remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the judgment, sentence, and guilty
plea. The Florida Supreme Court did not make any determination of the questions of law,
relying on the motion in confession of error by the Florida attorney general. 247 So. 2d at 54.
183 249 So. 2d at 48-49. In an unusual opinion, the court reversed itself on equal protection
grounds:
Under the requirement of the equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions, the benefits of the same rule of law must be accorded all prisoners whose convictions rest on a guilty plea. Accordingly we recede from so much of our opinion as stands
for the proposition that a Brady violation is inapplicable where the charges are disposed
of by a guilty plea rather than a trial. Conversely stated, we are required to hold by the
position taken by the Attorney General that a guilty plea does not cure a Brady defect.
Id. at 49.
184 See notes 24-25 & accompanying text supra.
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view that a guilty plea is a final determination of factual guilt can be
mitigated by reading the Brady rule to hold that the nondisclosure of
evidence which factually exculpates the defendant is ground for setting
the plea aside.
C.

FACTUAL BASIS

The third model is a logical corollary of Justice White's theory of
the guilty plea as an admission of guilt. This model states that the plea
should be invalidated if the prosecution fails to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession at the time of the plea. In short, the prosecution's
withholding of evidence which refutes the defendant's admission of guilt
vitiates that admission. Therefore, a plea of guilty must have a sound
basis in fact.
Many guilty plea acceptance procedures require the trial judge to
satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea.185 Menna v. New
York, 18 6 a per curzt'm opinion, contains a footnote articulating Justice
White's view that an admission of factual guilt should end all inquiries
into the validity of the plea except those which directly bear on the
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Discussing the Brady trilogy and Tollett v. Henderson, the Court stated:
The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of
factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly
removes the issue of factual guilt from the case. In most cases, factual guilt
is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of punishment. A guilty plea,
therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which
do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilt is validly estab87
lished.'
Thus if a plea of guilty is to function as a final determination of factual
guilt, the defendant should be allowed to challenge the validity of his
plea by showing that evidence which the prosecution did not disclose
185 Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that guilty
pleas are the product of free and intelligent choice, various state and federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, and until the judge taking the plea has
inquired into and sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim
of innocence.
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.10 (1970) (citations omitted).
186 423 U.S. 61.

187 Id at 62 n.2 (emphasis in original). Professor Alschuler rephrased Justice White's statement thus:
These defendants have solemnly admitted their guilt, and that being so, we do not care
what may have happened to them in the past. The whole purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine whether a defendant is guilty, and once that question is satisfactorily
answered in the affirmative, the state's consequent right to incarcerate the defendant is
established absolutely.
Alschuler (COLO. 1975), supra note 29, at 32-33.
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would negate his admission of factual guilt. A requirement of a showing
that the nondisclosed evidence would negate factual guilt is equivalent
to the Agurs reasonable doubt standard, 8 8 which is the standard of materiality in the usual guilty plea case. This model requires the defendant
to affirmatively disprove his guilt in order to establish a Brady v. Maryland violation. Although it places an onerous burden of proof on the
defendant, the factual basis model is less harsh than the forfeiture
model, which simply does not allow any Brady v. Maryland claim following a guilty plea. 8 9
People v. Gott 190 exemplifies the operation of the reasonable doubt
standard. Because the defense had entered a general request for evidence, the court relied on Agurs for the standard of materiality. Finding
that the evidence at issue, the statements of a codefendant, was completely inculpatory, the court held that the nondisclosure was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Disclosure of the statements at the time of
the plea, the court observed, would not have induced the defendant to
go to trial. 19 1
The reasonable doubt standard does not encompass the entire inquiry a reviewing court must make in assessing the validity of a guilty
plea according to the factual basis model. If a guilty plea is to function
as an admission of the defendant's guilt, then the nature of the evidence
withheld is determinative of the Brady v. Mayland question. The withheld evidence must erode the factual basis for the plea. The insanity
defense illustrates this inquiry. In a case of first-degree murder, for instance, evidence of the defendant's insanity at the time of the crime may
serve to negate the element of intent. Hence nondisclosure of this evidence would be ground for setting aside a guilty plea to that charge
because this evidence destroys the factual accuracy of the plea.
More often, however, an insanity defense is an excuse rather than a
complete defense. The defendant admits the requisite act and intent,
but claims that his insanity renders him not guilty in that the state cannot punish him. A justification for the crime, such as self-defense, has
the same effect as an excuse; both are affirmative defenses. An affirmative defense is complete in the sense that it will prevent the state from
obtaining a valid conviction, even if the state can show that the defendant was factually guilty of the crime.
Therefore, the model which states that a guilty plea cuts off all
188 427 U.S. at 112-13. See text accompanying notes 75-95 sufira.
189 See text accompanying notes 171-89 supira.
190 43 Ill. App. 3d 137, 356 N.E.2d 1102. See text accompanying notes 121-24 supra.
191 43 I1. App. 3d at 142, 356 N.E.2d at 1106. The court vacated the defendant's sentence
and remanded because the prosecutor reneged on his promise not to make a sentencing recommendation.
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claims unrelated to factual guilt would have to allow for Brady v. Magrland claims that the evidence suppressed by the prosecution would have
aided the defendant in the establishment of a legal excuse or a justification for the crime. A guilty plea does not waive rights that would give
the defendant a complete defense to the charge, regardless of whether
92
the defendant was aware of these rights at the entry of his plea.
Two federal cases illustrate that a complete defense cannot be
waived. In Clements v. Coiner, 193 the defendant pleaded guilty to a murder charge. The prosecution withheld the results of a polygraph test
and a letter from a psychiatrist, both of which corroborated a theory of
the defendant's insanity at the time of the crime (which occurred in
1956). Both of the defendant's lawyers testified at a 1968 evidentiary
hearing that the evidence would have materially aided the defense. The
district court held that due process demanded that the plea be invalidated, stating:
The possibility of mental defects and the resultant limitations of criminal
responsibility raised thereby amply support a determination of materiality
...
A further examination into the petitioner's condition might well
have altered the entire course of events, for the prosecution obviously accepted the petitioner's guilty plea knowing that there was a serious ques194
tion as to petitioner's mental capacity at the time of the alleged crime.
In the second case, Fambo v. Smith,195 the evidence withheld by the
prosecution clearly proved the impossibility of the defendant's perpetration of the second count of the crime. Fambo was charged with two
identical counts of possession of dynamite with intent to use it unlawfully. In exchange for Fambo's plea of guilty, the prosecution dropped
the first of these charges. The first count charged the defendant with
possession of dynamite with intent to use it unlawfully on November 29,
1970; the second count charged him with the same crime committed on
December 1, 1970. Sometime between these two dates, the police found
and destroyed the dynamite, replacing the contents of the tubes with
sawdust. Thus, Fambo's commission of the second count was impossible. Despite the fact that the assistant district attorney and law enforcement officers were aware of the replacement, no information regarding
it was imparted to the defendant and his counsel during plea negotiations. Defense counsel made no request for this evidence. Despite the
erosion of the factual basis for the second count, the court denied habeas
corpus relief on a finding that Fambo had gotten the benefit of his bar192 Note, supra note 159, at 1446.
193 299 F. Supp. 752.

194 id at 754.
195 433 F. Supp. 590.
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gain. 196

The model, which states that a plea of guilty is an admission of
factual guilt that cuts off all claims unrelated to factual guilt, poses some
problems in application. The standard of materiality required by this
model is the equivalent of the reasonable doubt standard, which effec197
tively requires the reviewing court to try the case for the first time.
Essentially, the Fambo and Clements courts did just that. However, since
the trial judge, in accepting a guilty plea, generally does not conduct a
penetrating inquiry into the strength of the state's unpresented case
when accepting a guilty plea, 98 he cannot know whether the defendant
would be able to present evidence sufficient to establish a complete defense but for the Brad violation. Yet the standard of materiality contemplated by the factual basis model and by United States v. Agurs
requires the reviewing court to divine the relative strengths of the evidence on either side in assessing the defendant's claim of a Brady violation.
The difficulty of characterizing evidence as representative of a complete or incomplete defense creates a related problem. An incomplete
defense may be complete in the sense that it absolutely prevents conviction. For example, a defendant's claim of illegal search and seizure
might prevent the state from introducing its principal piece of evidence
against him at trial. The state simply would not pursue the prosecution
any further. Thus, the defendant constructively has an absolute defense
stemming from a procedural claim.
Defenses and procedural rights cannot be neatly catalogued. The
question arises whether this differentiation should be attempted for the
purpose of deciding which rights are forfeited and which are preserved
by a guilty plea. Every piece of evidence, even inculpatory evidence,
could be useful to the defense in some way. The variety of possible defenses available to even an obviously guilty defendant and his creative
counsel, coupled with the fact that most of the information in the prosecutor's file is not easily pigeonholed, make categorization of evidence for
purposes of the factual basis model nearly impossible. Moreover, no differentiation should be attempted because Brady v. Ma1and holds that all
nondisclosed evidence favorable to the defendant and material to the
issue of guilt or punishment is functionally equivalent.' 99
Id at 600.
197 See note 188 sufira.
198 See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
199 373 U.S. at 87.
196
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DUE PROCESS

Three models were discussed that treat Brady material withheld in
the context of plea negotiations differently from the same suppression of
evidence before a trial. First, a plea of guilty coupled with a Brady violation can be considered unintelligent because defense counsel lacked sufficient information to effectively assist the defendant in making an
informed decision how to plead. Second, a claim of preplea suppression
of Brady material is forfeited by a guilty plea because a Brady violation is
curable in that the state is not barred from obtaining a conviction.
Third, Justice White's theory that a guilty plea is an admission of factual guilt which waives all antecedent constitutional violations unrelated to the issue of factual guilt was considered. All of these arguments
fail to provide an adequate safeguard of the guilty pleading defendant's
right to disclosure because their logically appealing distinctions break
down when applied to real cases.
The small percentage of criminal defendants who stand trial are
assured, through judicial supervision, the full protection of the procedural rights guaranteed by the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments. The
majority of defendants, because they are convicted on the basis of their
own pleas outside the purview of judges, are denied an adequate safeguard of their right to due process. Only after the defendant is committed to a plea bargain is a formal and largely perfunctory 2° ° effort made
to assess the validity of the plea.
Brady v. Mayland was predicated on the due process clause.20 1 Its
language is nebulous; hence its underlying due process rationale can bet20 2
ter be seen in Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Giles v. Mayland.
This concurring opinion is important because it is a persuasive, albeit
liberal, interpretation of what the Court left unsaid in Brady v. Mayland.
Justice Fortas argued that the state's responsibility to ensure the defendant a fair trial under the due process clause calls for broad disclosure of
evidence to the defense. 20 3 If the reason for the prosecutorial duty to
disclose is to assure the criminal defendant a fair procedure, then full
disclosure of material and favorable information to the defense should
not be hindered by an overly technical interpretation of the Brady rule.
Examples of technical impediments would include the Court's own
strict reading of the rule in United States v. Agurs, 20 4 the needless step of
20 5
determining materiality on the basis of traditional notions of waiver,
200
201
202
203
204
205

See text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
373 U.S. at 87. See text accompanying notes 65-74 supra.
386 U.S. at 96-102 (Fortas, J., concurring). See text accompanying notes 81-84 supra.
386 U.S. at 98.
427 U.S. 97. See text accompanying notes 75-95 supra.
See text accompanying notes 145-65 supra.
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and a requirement that the withheld evidence negate an admission of
guilt. 20 6 These obstacles in the path of prosecutorial disclosure of mate-

rial and favorable evidence are as inconsistent with due process as burdens on the exercise of any other constitutional right. Several courts
faced with a Brady violation preceding a guilty plea have used a due
process rationale to afford relief where no request for Brady material was
made.
In Evans v.Kropp,207 the defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree
murder. Evidence of his postarrest suicide attempt and his psychiatrist's
testimony 20° was not brought to the attention of the trial judge who
accepted the plea.2 0 9 The court granted the defendant a writ of habeas
corpus, stating: "[Tlhe controlling factor in a procedure where material
information in the possession of any state agency is not disclosed to the
court is not whether defense counsel knew or should have known about
it, but rather whether the procedure as a whole comported with the
'2 10
requirements of due process.
What appears to be the most comprehensive statement to date 2 1'
on the application of Brady v.Matlandin the guilty plea context is Fambo
v. Smith.212 Distinguishing the Brady trilogy by saying that the pleas at
issue in the trilogy were valid when entered, 2 13 the court reasoned that
Fambo would have been denied due process of law had he gone to trial
according to Brady v. Magland and United States v. Agurs. 2 14 Writing for
the court, Chief Judge Curtin maintained that the prosecutor should
have disclosed the evidence in questibn in order for defense counsel to be
able to advise the defendant whether to plead or stand trial. Otherwise,
the plea could not have been voluntary, intelligent, and completely
2 15
counselled.
Thus the court took the additional step of trying to conform the
Brady v. Maitlandrule with the traditional concept of waiver espoused in
206 See text accompanying notes 186-99 supra.

207 254 F. Supp. 218.
208 The psychiatrist had testified at a prior sanity hearing that the defendant was schizophrenic and therefore incompetent to stand trial. Id
209 The psychiatrist's findings evidently were communicated to the police guard and to
defense counsel but not to the prosecutor. Id at 220-22.
210 Id at 222. The court found that the defense counsel's personal view that informing the
court of the defendant's incompetency would not help the defendant and his consequent
nondisclosure of that information violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel.
211 Butl se United States v. Wolczik, No. 76-245.
212 433 F. Supp. 590. See text accompanying notes 195-96 supra.
213 433 F. Supp. at 594. Thus the court agreed with Justice White's view that the Brady
trilogy decisions were not grounded in the traditional concept of waiver.
214 Id at 597. The court cited Agurs for the proposition that no defense request is necessary
where the evidence withheld is so obviously exculpatory.
215 Id at 598-99.
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Johnson v.Zerbst. Chief Judge Curtin bridged this gap by relying on the
assumptions made by the Supreme Court in its opinions approving the
practice of plea negotiation, 216 and concluded that Fambo's plea was
voluntary and intelligent. 2 17 However, Fambo was denied due process
in the negotiations preceding his plea, even though he was not harmed
by the nondisclosure insofar as his sentence was concerned. The prosecution did not negotiate honestly, inviting error by deliberately withholding material and favorable evidence from the defense and the trial
judge. The court relied on Santobello v. New York2 18 for the proposition
that judicial tolerance of plea bargaining "presuppose[s] fairness in se'2 19
curing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor.
In ExpcarteLewis, 220 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that
due process demands that Brady v.Magland be equally applied to guilty
pleading and trial defendants. Lewis alleged that a psychiatrist's letter,
to the effect that he was insane at the time of the crime and was incompetent to stand trial, was not disclosed to his counsel. 22 1 As the letter
was obviously material and favorable, under Agurs it should have been
disclosed even in the absence of a request. After finding that his newly
appointed defense counsel would not have allowed Lewis to plead guilty

222
Lewis' guilty plea.223
if he had known of the letter, the court set aside

The compelling nature of the evidence withheld in each of these
cases may have dictated the courts' decisions to apply Brady v. Maryland.
In contrast, the courts in UnitedStates ex rel Suggs v. La Vallee 224 and People
v. Hera 22 5 frankly disbelieved the claims of the guilty pleading defendants that evidence tending to show their incompetence at the time of
their pleas was withheld, and affirmed their convictions. A unifying factor among the cases discussed which were decided after 1976, namely
216
217
218
219
220
221

See notes 218-19 infra.
433 F. Supp. at 600.
404 U.S. 257.
Id at 261.
No. 60,645.
I
The letter was written to the defendant's original counsel. A new attorney was

appointed to represent Lewis after a change of venue, and this attorney was not furnished
with a copy of the letter, although the prosecutor had a copy. Id
222 The overriding concern is whether a defendant has been deprived of due process and
due course of law. . . . If anything the denial of due process and due course of law
would be greater than in a contested case if an incompetent defendant were permitted
(as the applicant was) to waive such constitutional and statutory rights ....
id
223 One judge dissented on the ground that the evidence showed that the prosecutor's file
was open to the defense, and that Lewis himself was aware of the letter and should have
informed his attorney of it. Id
224 422 F. Supp. 1042. The evidence as to the defendant's competence was equivocal.
225 54 111. App. 3d 527, 369 N.E.2d 922. The defendant's suicidal tendency, standing alone,
did not establish a mental disorder.

1981]

DISCLOSURE AND THE BRADY TRILOGY

People v. Gott,226 United States v. Wolczik,227 Fambo v. Smith, and Ex pare
Lewis, is the courts' adherence to the Agurs reasonable doubt standard
despite their differing views on the applicability of Brady v. Magland in
the guilty plea context. This adherence raises the question whether the
concept of due process in plea negotiations2 28 would prompt a court to
apply a more lenient standard of materiality.
The decisions of two state courts that have considered the issue of
the prosecutor's duty to disclose tactical evidence during plea negotiations are illustrative. In State v. _Pitts,229 the two defendants pleaded
guilty to first-degree murder, were tried on the issue of punishment, and
received death sentences. Among other grounds urged in a motion to
vacate their pleas was the claim that the state suppressed favorable evidence in the form of witnesses' unsigned statements that proclaimed the
defendant's innocence and were later repudiated. 230 Confessing error,
the Florida attorney general stated that this was a Brady violation because defense counsel might have chosen to go to trial to submit the
issue of the witnesses' credibility to a jury had he been aware of their
prior statements. Basing its decision on the equal protection clause, the
court held that the withholding of evidence which would aid the defense
in impeaching the credibility of witnesses violated Brady v.Magland
23
notwithstanding a guilty plea. '
The court in People v. Jones232 decided the same issue oppositely.
The district attorney failed to disclose that the complaining witness had
died during plea negotiations, and the defendant pleaded guilty to
third-degree robbery. The Court of Appeals of New York decided that
the evidence of the complaining witness's death was "highly material to
the practical, tactical considerations which attend a determination to
plead guilty, but not to the legal issue of guilt itself."23 3 Thus the court
phrased the issue as whether this nondisclosure was so serious as to be a
226 43 Ill.
App. 3d 137, 356 N.E.2d 1102.
227 No. 76-245. See text accompanying notes 149-55 supra.
228 Alsehuler (YALE 1975), suipra note 42, at 1229; Uviller, supra note 54, at 113-14; Comment, supra note 119.
229 249 So. 2d 47. See text accompanying notes 182-83 supra.
230 The defendants succeeded in this claim before the trial court and the state appealed.
The District Court of Appeal (the same panel that decided 249 So. 2d 47) reversed in a
decision reported at 241 So. 2d 399 (1971), stating that "the evidence appellees [defendants]
claim was suppressed was not only believed by the State to be untrue, the same having been
repudiated. . . but it could have been useful to the defense only with reference to credibility,
had Pitts and Lee pleaded not guilty." 241 So. 2d at 412. This decision was remanded by the
Florida Supreme Court in 247 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1971).
231 249 So. 2d at 50.
232 44 N.Y.2d 76, 375 N.E.2d 41, 404 N.Y.S.2d 85.
233 Id at 80, 375 N.E.2d at 43, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
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denial of due process,2 34 given that the prosecutor's concern should be
the pursuit ofjustice and not solely the pursuit of conviction. The court
added, however, that it was not a fundamental concern of criminal justice "that a possibly guilty actor shall escape conviction because the People are not able to establish his guilt." 2 3 5 Thus the court held that the
prosecutor did not have an affirmative duty to disclose tactical information. In support of its decision, the court noted that the prosecutor need
not share the weaknesses of his case with the defendant and quoted Brad
v. United States for the proposition that "a defendant is not entitled to
withdraw his plea merely because he discovers. . . that his calculus misapprehended the quality of the state's case." '236 Nevertheless, the court
implied that the plea might be set aside in a situation where the same
evidence was withheld from a defendant who, unlike Jones, insisted
upon his innocence and decided to negotiate a plea because he felt that
the prosecution's case was strong enough to assure him a more severe
237
sentence if he chose to go to trial.
As the court in People v. Jones recognized, the Constitution assures a
criminal defendant his procedural rights, but it does not require that
successive and futile efforts be made to acquit him on appeal. The argument for a lowered standard of materiality required of a guilty pleading
defendant asserting a Brady v. Maryland violation is not, however, an argument for acquittal at all costs, but rather an argument for due process
of law. Although it is the predominant means of conviction, plea bargaining continues to be an informal and unsupervised process. Constitutional safeguards are more honored in the breach in plea negotiation.
Professor Alschuler has even suggested that recent increases in the percentage of convictions by negotiated plea are due to the cumbersomeness of trial procedures mandated by the Court's due process
revolution. 238 Indeed, the fact that the Court has so burdened the trial
with procedural protections while assuming that plea negotiations are
conducted fairly is ironic.
In Giles v. Magland, Justice Fortas in his concurring opinion
pointed out the further irony that the Court, after setting up a new rule
of procedural fairness in Brady v. Matland, burdened that rule with a
specific request requirement. 239 Justice Fortas argued that due process
required broad disclosure of material and favorable evidence by the
234 Id

235 Id at 82, 375 N.E.2d at 44. 404 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
236 Id (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757).
237

Id

238 Alschuler (1968), supra note 35, at 50-51.
239 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. at 96-106 (Fortas, J., concurring). See text accompanying

notes 81-84 & 202-03 supra.
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prosecution. 240 The argument for a lower standard of materiality for a
defendant asserting a Brady v. Mayland claim after a plea conviction is
essentially a fairness argument. As the Evans v. Kropp court recognized,
the question is not so much the importance of the evidence withheld as
it is whether the plea negotiations "as a whole comported with the requirements of due process."' 24' The Lewis court called due process of
law "the overriding concern" in determining whether the Brady rule was
242
violated in plea negotiations.
Moreover, the focus of a Brady inquiry following a plea conviction
should be on whether the defendant and his counsel could make an informed choice between a negotiated plea and a trial. In Fambo, the
court directed its attention to the choice between a plea and a trial,
finding that the defendant's counsel must be able to competently advise
him as to the choice. 243 Although it based its holding on the equal protection clause, the court in Pitts found that fairness to the guilty pleading defendant demanded disclosure under Brad v. Marland of even
tactical evidence because of its impact on the defendant's decision
whether to stand trial.24 4 The Pitts court alone appears to have adopted
a lower standard of materiality for defendants convicted on their pleas,
yet the courts deciding the other cases discussed have considered the
defendant's decision to plead. The argument for a separate standard of
materiality for guilty pleading defendants is grounded generally in the
concept of fairness in plea negotiation, and specifically in the defendant's right to an informed choice between a guilty plea and a trial.
V.

CONCLUSION

Fairness in plea bargaining clearly cannot be presupposed, as the
Court does in Santobello v. New York. 245 Plea bargaining, which emerged
in the late nineteenth century as a derivative of urban caretaker politics, 246 continues to be an unstructured, unsupervised yet well-established
practice. The guilty pleading defendant's constitutional protections are
treated as bargaining chips in negotiation if they are recognized at
all. 247 Fairness in plea bargaining can, however, be fostered by a rule
that a guilty plea does not cure an antecedent violation of the
386 U.S. at 98.
254 F. Supp. at 222.
Ex parte Lewis, No. 60,645. See note 222 .wpra.
Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. at 594-600. See text accompanying notes 195-96 & 21217 supra. See also Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d at 134-35; Zacek v. Brewer, 241 N.W.2d at 50-52;
text accompanying notes 156-65 sufra.
244 State v. Pitts, 249 So. 2d at 50. See text accompanying notes 182-83 & 229-31 supra.
245 404 U.S. at 261.
246 Alschuler (1979), supra note 9, at 24-26.
247 See text accompanying note 49 su/ira.
240
241
242
243
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prosecutorial duty to disclose, and by a more lenient standard of materiality for the defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis of
such a violation. Thus the interpretation of the Brad v. United States
trilogy248 that a plea constitutes a waiver of all unknown rights and defenses cannot be maintained because it denies the criminal defendant
due process in the conduct of plea negotiation.
In United States v. Agurs,249 the Court held that the standard of materiality to be met by the defendant who has made no request or a general request for material and favorable evidence is whether the
nondisclosed evidence would create a reasonable doubt of guilt. The
judiciary and commentators have argued cogently that the prosecutor's
duty to disclose should not depend on a specific request, which is a needless technical impediment to a rule predicated on fairness to the defendant.250 Similarly, the reasonable doubt standard is an overly technical
requirement that frustrates the purpose of the Brady v. Magland rule in
the guilty plea context. The demands of due process would be better
served if a more lenient standard of materiality replaced the reasonable
doubt standard for the guilty pleading defendant who has made no request or only a general request for Brady material. 25 1 The defendant's
assertion that material and favorable evidence was withheld prior to the
entry of his plea should trigger a lower standard of materiality which
would encompass those types of evidence bearing directly upon the defendant's decision whether to plead guilty or to stand trial. This standard reaches beyond the material and favorable evidence that is
traditional Brady material, as the latter standard is premised on a trial.
Thus the lower standard must necessarily include some evidence which
for trial purposes would be denominated tactical or merely cumulative.
Brady v. Magland, therefore, should be interpreted to demand
prosecutorial disclosure of favorable evidence material either to the issue
of guilt or punishment, or to the informed decision to waive the right to
trial.
However, the broadened duty to disclose should not impose the
burden of sorting through every file on the prosecutor in order to produce evidence which only defense counsel is capable of finding. The
demands of the prosecutor's caseload and his adversary posture make
the imposition of a new burden inappropriate. Moreover, the Brady rule
does not and should not require the prosecutor to prepare the defendant's case for him. Broad, enforceable provisions for criminal defense
248 Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759; Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742.
249 427 U.S. at 112-13.
250 See note 82 supra.
251 See text accompanying notes 96-126 supra.
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discovery, preplea, and pretrial, are the solution to this disclosure problem. The easiest way to ensure preplea compliance with Brad v. Ma land is to allow defense counsel to read the prosecutor's file while
retaining the sanction of vacating of the plea and allowing the defendant to replead if Brady material, liberally conceived, is negligently or
intentionally withheld from the file.
The economic realities of the criminal justice system and the growing criminal population dictate that plea bargaining cannot be alto252
gether abolished, as many in the academic community would prefer.
The majority of criminal defendants are convicted by their pleas of
guilty. These defendants waive their right to trial and its attendant
rights, but they do not waive the right to due process of law entirely.
They remain entitled to procedural fairness in the conduct of plea negotiations. The practice of plea bargaining can be a fair and legitimate
alternative to trial if the rudiments of due process, among which is the
Brady v. Mayland rule, were incorporated in the ground rules.
LEE SHEPPARD

252 See note 25 sufira.

